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Can nominal contracts create monetary nonneutrality if they arise 
endogenously in general equilibrium?  Yes,  if (1)  agents have complete 
information about the money stock and (2) shocks to the system are purely 
redistributive and private information,  precluding conventional insurance 
markets.  Without contracts,  money is neutral toward aggregate quantities. 
However, risk-sharing  between suppliers and demanders creates an 
incentive for both parties to use nominal contracts.  In  particular, if an 
increase in the money growth rate signals a rise in the dispersion of shocks 
to demanders' wealth, then prices adjust only partially to monetary shocks and 
money is positively associated with output. 
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Many macroeconomists believe that some form of price stickiness underlies 
the observed positive association of high money growth and high real activity 
at business-cycle  frequencies.  Often, this price stickiness is asserted to 
arise from explicit or implicit contracts.  Model economies that do not 
include nominal contracts are consequently viewed as omitting the basic cause 
of monetary nonneutrality.  For example,  Lucas's (1972) pathbreaking 
general-equilibrium  model of business fluctuations -- which employs imperfect 
aggregate information to generate monetary nonneutrality -- has been widely 
criticized for excluding nominal contracts,  even though no economic forces 
would lead these to arise endogenously.  Yet, in the past decade, few 
similarly explicit model economies have been produced that (1) derive a role 
for  nominal contracts from underlying assumptions about the economic 
environment and (2) explain the implications of contract arrangements for 
money and business cycles.  l  Contract theory seemingly could not justify 
nominal contracts;  today, the foundations of sticky prices rest more on the 
cost of price changes (Rotemberg [1982],  Parkin [1986]),  or on the 
multiplicity of rational-expectations  equilibria (Azariadis and Cooper 
[1985b]). 
This paper provides a simple rational-expectations  general-equilibrium 
model in  which endogenously generated contracts make a difference.  That is, 
under some fiscal-monetary  regimes,  contracts simultaneously make prices 
sticky (so that they respond less than proportionately to changes in the 
quantity of money) and lead to a causal positive relationship between 
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economy is a variant of Lucas's (1972) setup.  The difference is that we assume 
monetary changes are neutral toward real aggregates in the absence of 
contracts because economic agents accurately perceive these  change^.^ 
These results derive from four underlying assumptions about the 
preferences, technology,  and information structure of a stochastic 
consumption-loans  model that is in most other ways identical to the 
full-information  version employed by Lucas.  First,  risk-averse  demanders of 
money are subject to idiosyncratic individual disturbances that are private 
information.  That is,  there is a demand for insurance against idiosyncratic 
disturbances, but the fact that these are private rules out the operation of 
conventional insurance markets, which make payments contingent upon 
verifiable losses.  Second,  the growth rate of money is positively 
associated with the dispersion of individual disturbances.  This assumption, 
though not standard in formal modeling,  has received attention from both 
monetary theorists and policymakers.  Third,  prior to the realization  of money 
growth or individual shocks,  suppliers of goods can compete by offering 
alternative contracts that specify a relationship between money growth and 
price adjustments.  Fourth,  the technology of exchange dictates that an 
individual visit only one supplier after realization  of aggregate and 
individual disturbances  . 
In this environment,  welfare can be improved by competitive contracts that 
embody a shifting of risk,  with resources being transferred between suppliers 
and demanders in contingencies that involve high individual uncertainty. 
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prices rise less than proportionately and production/effort expands when money 
growth is high.  Conversely,  prices fall less than  proportionately and 
production/effort  contracts when money growth is low.3 
In  our model economy, a Phillips curve emerges under two conditions:  (1) 
an interaction of individual and aggregate uncertainty and (2) an 
incompleteness of markets,  which is due to private information.  We conjecture 
that our analysis illustrates a more general idea; that is,  our results depend 
more on the existence of market incompleteness  than on the specific rationale. 
This paper contributes to a growing area of the microfoundations 
literature that uses contract theory to model the real effects of monetary 
disturbances.  Not all of this literature attempts to model sticky prices. 
For example, Farmer (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1986) pinpoint credit as 
the transmission mechanism.  Naturally, such studies have a distinctive 
emphasis and use quite different techniques. 
Much of the literature,  however, does try to justify the sticky prices and 
wages so central to the policy-oriented  models of Gray (1976).  Fischer (1977), 
and Taylor (1980).  In some cases,  sticky prices emerge almost as an 
afterthought;  in Rogerson and Wright (1988), positive money shocks create an 
inflation tax and reduce wealth,  which in turn affect labor supply and thus 
unemployment.  In contrast, the bubble (or self-fulfilling-prophecy) 
literature attempts to explain sticky prices, output fluctuations,  and other 
business-cycle  phenomena as market-based  occurrences that depend on 
expectations,  not contracts (Azariadis and Guesnerie [1986]). 
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insure against risk.  As in  Azariadis and Cooper (1985a) and Cooper (1988)  , 
contracts produce sticky prices to provide insurance against social risk, 
ensuring that risk is shared optimally across different groups. 
Several salient features distinguish this work from that of Azariadis and 
Cooper,  both in terms of  modeling techniques and results.  On the technical 
level,  our model uses distributional rather than aggregate risk:  Each 
individual's position is uncertain,  but the total wealth of society is not. 
One advantage of this approach is that it produces sticky prices by using only 
monetary shocks.  Slowly adjusting prices help to insure consumers against 
random monetary injections by shifting some of the risk to producers.  The 
risk-sharing  arrangement in this study also differs from that of  Azariadis 
and Cooper.  Here,  contracts spread the risk among all agents in the economy; 
this broad distribution makes sense because all parties are then risk-averse. 
In  Azariadis and Cooper,  risk is shifted to the risk-neutral  producer class 
(perhaps imperfectly,  because of inefficiencies that result). 
As might be expected,  these different modeling techniques generate new and 
distinctive results.  In  our model,  prices are sticky but not fixed;  that 
is,  they adjust -- although not proportionately -- to changes in the money 
supply.  One important advantage of this approach over the fixed-price 
formulation is that it generates a Phillips curve (a positive relation between 
inflation and output).  Azariadis and Cooper do not even permit the money 
supply to change.  Our formulation,  on the other hand,  allows policy questions 
to be considered in a natural way:  for example,  how does increasing monetary 
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neutral? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  The basic structure 
of our model is outlined in section I.  Competitive equilibrium without 
contracts is discussed in section 11,  and competitive equilibrium with 
contracts is developed in section 111.  Section IV summarizes and concludes. 
I.  Structure of the Economy 
In  this section,  we outline a stochastic consumption-loans  model that 
draws heavily on Lucas (1972).  In  each period,  N identical individuals are 
born, each of whom lives for two periods.  In the initial period of the life 
cycle,  effort is supplied in amount n and goods are consumed in amount c.  In 
the latter period,  goods are consumed in amount c'  (a prime denotes an  updated 
variable).  Each individual's preferences for consumption and leisure are 
given  by the utility function: 
U(c,  1 -  n)  + V(c'  ) 
Following Lucas,  we assume that: (1) U is increasing in consumption and 
leisure,  strictly concave,  and twice continuously differentiable; (2) V is 
increasing,  strictly concave,  and twice differentiable;  (3) V is restricted so 
that current consumption and leisure are not inferior goods;  and (4) agents' 
preferences are the expected value of equation (1) under situations of 
uncertainty.  In  addition to Lucas's preference assumptions,  we require that 
old-age  utility exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion. 
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One  unit of effort yields one  unit of  output within the period,  but goods  are 
not storable. 
There are a large number  of  islands (indexed by  k = 1, 2, ...  K)  in which 
productive activity occurs.  At each date (indexed by  t = 0, 1 ...), it is 
physically possible to transact (produce or consume)  in only one  of  these 
marketplaces.  In each period, J = N/K  agents of  each  generation are presumed 
to transact in each market  (in equilibrium).  In contrast to Lucas,  there are 
no  exogenous  shifts in  demand  across markets  (caused by  a random  distribution 
of  traders), and agents are fully cognizant of  the terms  of  trade in other 
markets  (although this information has no  value in our  setup).  The  importance 
of  market  structure is explained in more  detail below. 
Random  money  supply is the basic source of  uncertainty in our model.  Not 
only is the aggregate  level of money  uncertain, as in Lucas,  but a source of 
individual uncertainty is added  as well.  On the aggregate  level, we  assume 
that money  changes  through  time  according to 
m'  = mx.  (2) 
Here,  m'  is the next period's money  supply,  m  is this period' s money  supply, 
and x  is the growth  factor; hence,  the growth rate is x  -  1.  We  assume  that x 
is serially independent  with mean  Z.  Thus,  over  a single period,  the 
money  supply grows by  a random  factor x, which  is distributed as proportionate 
transfers to the holders of  money  (the elder generation), who  therefore spend 
m'.  Those  currently young  will take  m'  into the next period, where  they will 
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agents know the values of x and m,  which are the aggregate-state   variable^.^ 
This individual uncertainty, introduced through monetary transfers, is the 
key characteristic that distinguishes our study from that of Lucas.  Each old 
agent receives a transfer,  T,  that has a nominal value of T = qxm,  where q 
is the random shock that determines the amount of an individual's transfer. 
Transfers take this complicated form in order to prevent the nonneutralities 
that arise from a standard inflation tax.  With a different specification, 
sticky prices would still exist,  but the other effects would complicate the 
analysis.  Within each island (and,  a fortiori, in the aggregate), we require 
J 
that transfers in each period aggregate to zero, B  Tj = 0.  This expected 
j=O 
value of zero makes the transfers purely redistributive,  and therefore the 
uncertainty about the transfers is not aggregate but purely individual.  We 
further assume that q realizations  are private information,  so that 
conventional insurance arrangements are precluded.  In addition, the 
distribution of the "shock,"  q,  may depend upon money growth,  x,  so that the 
conditional density functions of q can be written as g(q;  x). 
This specification captures some of the uneven distribution of monetary 
injections (Friedman [1969,  section 1111,  Von Mises [1953,  chapter VI])  and 
suggests that such dispersion increases with the size of the inje~tion.~ 
One realistic  way that this could happen is if the various financial 
intermediaries react differently to monetary policies.  Reserve and deposit 
growth would then be differentially distributed across firms and their 
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argument;  by the 1970s,  however,  even the Federal Reserve recognized 
its validity (Burns [1978,  p. 951). 
This connection between individual uncertainty and aggregate quantity is 
not standard:  it destroys the simplicity of the representative-agent  model. 
Nevertheless,  Grossman,  Hart, and Maskin (1983) use this kind of relationship 
to great effect.  The specific interactions that we employ have often been 
considered,  but they have never before been formally incorporated into a 
model. 
Activities within each period adhere to the following sequence, 
illustrated in table 1. At the beginning of a period,  prior to realization of 
shocks,  old agents make locational decisions.  In the contractual version of 
our model, this is the interval in which young agents in a specific market 
offer contracts in order to attract demanders.  Subsequently,  realization of x 
and r)  takes place, followed by production and consumption. 
Table 1 
Sequence of Activities within a Time Period 
(1)  (2) 
location decisions;  realization 
contracts offered  of shocks 
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Because our analysis of the nature of competitive equilibrium without 
contracts is close to that of Lucas (1972),  our treatment of this subject will 
be brief, developing material that will be useful in subsequent discussion. 
Supply and demand for goods versus money determines the price level in our 
economy.  The market-clearing  value of this price (in any of the K identical 
islands) may be written as a function  of the state of the economy (x,m): 
P = $(x,m). 
Our analysis of the nature of this equilibrium price function follows 
Lucas.'  Only young agents face a nontrivial decision problem:  The old 
simply spend their accumulated cash  balances,  while the young must pick levels 
of consumption (c),  effort (n),  and money demand/saving  (A).  Recall that 
money serves as the intergenerational store of  value in the 
overlapping-generations  model; thus,  money held (A)  is also savings.  The 
young choose savings and effort to maximize expected utility: 
max [U(c,  1  -  n) + EV(c')lx,m] 
c,n,A 
s.t.  p(n  -  c)  -  A 2 0 
AX'  + q'x'm'  -  c'p' I  0, 
where E(  )Jx,m  denotes an expectation of a variable conditional on x and m, 
A is  nominal money demand, p'  is the future price level,  and so on.  The 
first constraint arises because money is the only store of value, so 
money-holding  reflects the difference between current production and 
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When old,  the agent's money balance constrains consumption.  The agent has 
savings (augmented by the proportional growth of money in the next period) 
Ax' and the random transfer g'x'm'. 
It is useful to solve this maximization problem in two stages.  First, 
consider picking efficient quantities of leisure and current consumption so as 
to maximize utility given a specific pattern of saving behavior.  The results 
of this maximization process are an indirect utility function and a 
conditional demand for goods and leisure (or, equivalently,  a supply of 
effort) . 
X  X  W(F)  = max (U(c,  1 -  n))  s.t. n -  c - -  2 0  P 
c  ,n 
X  c = 4  (-)  and n -  4  (A) 
c  P  n  P  .( 6) 
Previous assumptions imply that W is twice continuously differentiable and 
that 4c and 4n are continuously differentiable.  The assumption that 
consumption and leisure are normal goods implies that 4'= < 0 and that 
q5'n  > 0.8  Second,  consider selecting an efficient savings plan (X/p) 
so as to maximize 
X  g  'x'm'  W($  + Ev(F  + - 
P  '  >Ix,m,  or 
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condition for this plan is simply 
which states the standard first-order  condition for a risky asset: equality 
between current utility forgone with a unit of saving (X,p)  and expected 
future utility received. 
Individual income uncertainty (~'x'm')  may raise the demand for saving as 
a "hedge,"  under conditions on V discussed by Sandmo (1970).  This 
precautionary demand for saving is ensured if old-age  marginal utility is 
convex (V' " > 0), which is implied by diminishing absolute risk aversion. 
That is,  savings will rise with greater second-period  income uncertainty as 
long as the premium an individual  must be paid to accept a fixed actuarially 
fair bet declines with the level of future consumption (c').  Thus,  in 
comparison to Lucas's setup -- which involves no idiosyncratic income shocks 
-- there will be more desired saving (Xp) at any rate of return R'  = 
(pxl/p').  In competitive equilibrium,  money supply (xm) must equal money 
demand (A).  Requiring equation (7) to hold with X -  xm,  it is direct that 
the price level is proportional to the money stock in competitive equilibrium; 
that is,  p = $xm. 
W' (6')  =  -EIV1  (1 + rl')$-l]  lx,m  (8) 
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considered here,  because the left side sf equation (8) is decreasing in  11,  and 
the right side is increasing in 11,  (see footnote 6). 
Competitive equilibrium without contracts involves a neutrality of money, 
again following Lucas's 1972 study,  because agents have accurate information 
on the money stock.  Prices adjust proportionately to money shocks, and a high 
x is accurately reflected in prices, p = 11,~m.~  The micro-level  uncertainty 
leads to greater saving than Lucas found,  however,  so the price level is 
lower. This reflects a greater demand for money as a  hedge against future 
income uncertainty.  Nevertheless,  realizations of these micro disturbances 
have no effect on the price level,  although they do reallocate consumption 
across members of the elder generation. 
111.  Competitive Equilibrium with Contracts 
At the beginning of each period,  prior to the realization of aggregate and 
individual shocks,  we now permit the representative  young agent in each market 
to offer a contingent contract (it is best to view each island's  suppliers as 
clustered together into one firm so that no idiosyncratic demand risk is 
present).  Specifically,  we consider contracts that permit a demander to buy 
any quantity at the price 
P  = r(x)m, 
where the "price contract" (that is,  the function ~[x])  is chosen  by 
suppliers so as to maximize their lifetime expected utility subject to 
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demanders must achieve a level of expected utility at least equal to that 
achievable elsewhere (V).  Since a demander decides on a market prior to 
' r]m  - 
realization of x and r],  the relevant constraint is thus E(v[~  -1  )  1  V.  P  P 
The most general possible contract would allow an arbitrary exchange of 
goods for dollars and thus specify both prices and quantities; old agents 
might be unable to obtain all that they demand at the given price.  In 
addition,  it would allow contrived uncertainty through mixed strategies and 
lotteries.  Thus,  we compute the optimal contract over a limited -- though 
broad -- class of contracts.  One reason for this is that more complicated 
contracting strategies are often unsustainable (Haubrich and King [1983]). 
We restrict contracts mainly for tractability.  A  fully optimal analysis 
in an already incomplete  market model (OLG) would be difficult, as would the 
approach of specifying the costs and information structure that would make our 
contracts optimal in the broader class.  Still, the nonlinearity that we allow 
means that our contract should closely approximate the optimal one.  In 
addition, since a contract that replicates the "no contract" case of section 
I1 is feasible,  the optimal sticky-price  contract represents an improvement. 
In competitive equilibrium without contracts,  the presence of a large 
number of islands is inconsequential.  Prices and quantities are identical in 
each market.  Here,  suppliers in each island compete with those in other 
islands in offering contracts.  The presence of a large number of  markets 
permits us to reasonably treat 7 as not influenced by the contract 
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Pareto-efficient  contracts,  without determining the split of the gains from 
trade (q)  . 
A young agent on an island competes with young agents on other islands by 
offering contracts.  If a young agent tenders a contract that provides an 
expected utility of less than 7,  he attracts no money and consequently 
has zero consumption in the next period.  Conversely, if the contract gives 
expected utility of more than q,  everyone wants it.  We do not allow 
subcontracting,  so in the latter case the young agent would have to limit the 
number of contracts that he accepts (because meeting them all would leave him 
no leisure time),  and therefore he could meet his demand for saving (money). 
If the contract gives expected utility exactly equal to 7,  then we 
assume that the young agent obtains a proportional share (up to his demand) of 
the total money supply.  (The exact rationing rule does not matter for the 
ultimate equilibrium.)  In  full equilibrium,  each young agent maximizes 
expected utility given the contract choices of the others,  and the supply of 
money equals the demand.  We focus on the symmetric equilibrium, in which each 
young agent offers the same contract. 
Given the setup of the model, the indirect utility function  approach of 
the previous section remains  helpful.  But now,  real saving (X/n[x]m) 
depends on the contract chosen.  Additionally,  even though x(x)  is now an 
object of choice,  we continue to view suppliers as treating the distribution 
of future prices as invariant to their current actions, that is, taking 
the form p' = nl(x')m',  where T'  is not an  object of choice.  A currently 
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maximizing expected young-agent  utility (equation [ll.])  with respect to ~(x), 
subject to the demand constraint 
X  max E{w(-) 
?r(x>m 
It is possible to express this maximization problem as a control problem with 
an integral constraint as long as x is continuously distributed (see appendix 
for details). 
The solution to equation (10) selects the efficient contract given the 
money demand,  A, and the reservation utility of the old,  V.  From this 
set,  the individual young agent chooses optimal money demand.  The total of 
money demands must balance (the money market must clear).  As in the case 
without contracts,  the price level clears the market, adjusting to equate 
demand and supply.  In  the contract case, this involves shifting the level of 
- 
r(x),  in turn changing V.  A high demand for real balances by the young 
means a low general price level;  old agents get a lot for their money, giving 
- 
them high expected utility,  V. 
Money market clearing imposes the equilibrium condition X = xm. 
Substituting this into the equation (10) solution,  we obtain the key necessary 
condition for optimal price policy, a variant of Borch's rule for 
risk-sharing. That is,  it must be that 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmat each point on the range of x,  where a is the value of the multiplier 
attached to the constraint in equation (10).  This expression states equality 
(in each aggregate state x)  of the costs and benefits of transfers between the 
contracting parties.  lo 
To examine how contract prices move in response to changes in  x (that is, 
as one moves along the range of  x realizations), we implicitly differentiate 
equation (11) and rearrange terms,  yielding an elasticity 
d log r(x)  _  5 =  (1 -  a),  d log x  dx 
where 
a - (ar(x)  J V1  (  (q  x)dq)/(~'-o~[(l+q)~~~~]  Ix) 2 0  (also, a < 1). 
Roughly, a captures the shift in expected marginal utility induced by x 
because it shifts the distribution of q.  Note first that if the conditional 
distribution q is independent of x,  then the neutrality of money prevails in 
our contract equilibrium,  because a = 0.  That is,  prices adjust 
proportionately to changes in money and, consequently, there are no real 
effects.  We focus on the case where an increase in money growth (x)  induces a 
mean preserving spread on the distribution of individual shifts (see 
Rothschild and Stiglitz [I9701 and Diamond and Stiglitz (19741).  When a > 0, 
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old agents wish to purchase insurance against such aggregate states.ll 
Sticky prices provide this insurance by giving the elderly more purchasing 
power in states of high uncertainty.  The contract shifts some of the 
uncertainty's risk to the young. 
Thus,  the expected effect of changing x/.lt.(x) on old-agent  utility 
involves the interaction of the proportionate redistribution  of money (1 + q) 
and its marginal utility value (V')  in equation (13) above.  Prices will be 
sticky if a > 0.  The denominator is unambiguously positive from the 
definition of W and V in equations (4)  and (5).  With positive prices, the 
sign of a depends on (1 + q)~'g~dq. 
Sandmo's (1970) results on the theory of saving under uncertainty are 
pertinent to the interpretation  of this condition; that is,  E[(1  + q)V(c)]  is 
exactly the expected utility reward for investing at the random gross return 
(1 + q).  He notes that,  at a given level of saving,  increases in the 
dispersion of q may either lower or raise the reward,  even when V'  is convex. 
This ambiguity reflects two offsetting economic elements.  Individuals will 
want to save less to protect the income that they have,  but they will also 
want to save more as protection against a "rainy day."  That is,  first,  an 
increase in the level of interest-rate  uncertainty leads an agent to feel less 
inclined to expose current resources to  the possibility of loss; Sandmo 
identifies this effect formally with a negative substitution effect on saving. 
Second,  greater uncertainty about interest rates leads to an increased 
potential for low consumption,  which is highly valued.  Thus,  in a manner 
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positive impact on saving on this account.  As a result,  as x induces a mean 
preserving spread on q,  it will raise E( (1 + q)Vf [(I  + rl)-L]  )  .  (x) 
X  -- at a given -  -- as long as preferences are such that saving will rise  .(XI 
with interest-rate  uncertainty; that is,  individuals are not too willing to 
substitute for old-age  consumption. 
Specifically, following Diamond and Stiglitz (1974),  we require that 
U(C)  = -cVtI(c)/[V'(c)]  > 1 and that a (c) decreases with consumption,  which 
ensures that savings will rise with an increase in interest-rate 
uncertainty.12  In that case, there will be a contract specifying sticky 
prices and a positive relationship between money growth and output. 
Figures la and lb show the relationship between money growth, contract 
prices, and effort/production in our economy.  Equation (13) also demonstrates 
that the model displays a variant of Lucas's  (1973) hypothesis on the 
Phillips-curve  slope,  because greater variability in the growth component (x) 
reduces the responsiveness of output to monetary shocks.  Sticky prices 
probably do not uniquely support the insurance allocation.  Other mechanisms 
can insure the elderly, such as a social security program with direct 
(incentive-compatible)  payments that are linked to the monetary growth rate. 
Such schemes will not dominate the sticky-price  contract,  but merely support 
the same allocation in different ways.  l3  We believe that the 
sticky-price  contract is the best approximation of a real institution. 
Furthermore, the empirical predictions arising from our model -- connecting 
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researchers to determine whether or not our mechanism provides the insurance. 
Thus,  if transfers are in fixed nominal terms, the fact that money growth 
induces an increase in the dispersion of individual shocks can lead to the 
Phillips-curve  response illustrated in figure lb,  although it requires 
stronger restrictions on preferences than Lucas (1972) uses.  In  particular, 
we require that agents are relatively unwilling to substitute away from 
old-age  consumption.  With these preferences in place, increases in money 
growth are unmatched by proportional increases in the price level -- a result 
of the contract.  Thus,  an increase in money will provoke a positive output 
response. 
Intuitively,  what the contract does is protect consumers (the old) from 
the uncertainty and risk associated with random money injections.  Without 
contracts,  producers (the young) bear none of that risk because they adjust 
prices proportionally.  With contracts specifying sticky prices,  however, 
producers do bear some of the risk.  When the money supply is high, for 
example, they must produce more and work harder. 
IV.  Summary and Conclusions 
This theoretical investigation  was conducted under two guiding principles. 
First,  the analysis of sticky prices must be conducted in a 
general-equilibrium  setting in order to ensure consistent behavioral responses 
and to lay the groundwork for an examination of policy alternatives in 
accordance with the Lucas (1976) critique.  Typical,  sticky,  nominal-price 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmstories such as Fischer (1977) postulate nominal contracts,  exogenously 
imposing a pattern of arrangements on the labor market of an otherwise 
neoclassical model.  No specific gains result from nominal contracting at the 
private or social level identified in Fischer's or Taylor's (1979, 1980) 
models. 
These papers do demonstrate the important effects of nominal contracts, 
however.  Without an explicit framework that generates contracts endogenously, 
it is  possible that such sticky-price  models are internally consistent,  since 
factors motivating a demand for a specified wage contract may also restrict 
employment or consumption decisions.  Moreover,  these results are devoid of 
predictions about how contracts will change in the face of variations in the 
economic environment.  Second,  in our view, the analysis of sticky nominal 
prices requires explicit consideration of a monetary economy.  There 
must be elements of real uncertainty associated with monetary movements if 
nominal price stickiness is to be explained as a result of contractual 
arrangements that arise for risk-allocating  reasons.  Other recent work also 
adheres to these principles.  To the extent that menu-cost  and 
multiple-equilibrium  models lead to different testable implications,  they 
indicate the necessity of ascertaining the true cause of price stickiness. 
Different sources will create different macroeconomic implications, 
reemphasizing the point made above about the inadequacy of models that impose 
contracts exogenously. 
With these guiding principles,  we opted to study a stochastic 
consumption-loans  model that is a minor variation on Lucas (1972).  In this 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsetup,  monetary growth was assumed to be positively related to the dispersion 
of individual transfer payments.  Although money was neutral toward real 
aggregate quantities when an exogenous restriction was placed on contracts, 
neutrality did not continue to prevail when the restriction was lifted:  The 
sticktness  partially insured consumers against random money injections by 
shifting some of that risk to producers.  Rather,  competitive contracts 
specified price stickiness -- in the sense of less-than-proportionate 
adjustment in prices -- and,  consequently,  a positive relationship between 
production and money growth.  Thus,  our model economy provides a 
counter-example  to Barro's  (1976) conjecture that efficient competitive 
contracts necessarily reduce the dependence of output on nominal money growth. 
Finally,  our model economy incorporates some of the features that McCallum 
(1982) identifies as central elements of business fluctuations.  Suppliers set 
prices (contingency plans)  in advance of the realization of demand.  High 
money growth does lead to high output -- a result,  one can argue,  of prices 
that do not adjust enough.  At the same time, our model is not obviously 
Keynesian; that is,  important social costs of nominal contracting are not left 
uncontemplated in private arrangements. 
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In  this appendix,  we obtain the optimal contract for our model economy by 
solving an integral-constraint  control problem.  To do this,  we rely on 
methods provided by Takayama (1985,  chapter 8,  section C)  in his discussion of 
Hestenes  ' theorem. 
Recall that the island's objective is to maximize young-agent  utility 
subject to  the demand constraint that requires old-agent  utility to at least 
equal that achievable elsewhere.  The problem is to choose the price function 
X  (or,  in particular, n[x]) that maximizes E(w(-]  )  subject to 
dx>m 
E(v((~  + q)A))  2 v. 
71 (x) 
If we let h(x)  be the density function of x and g(q;  x)  be the 
conditional density function of E, the objective and constraint each take the 
form of an integral.  Specifically,  the constraint may be written as 
Forming the Hamiltonian according to Takayama's  methods,  we get 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwhere p  and a are multipliers.14  Since our problem is a variable 
right-side  endpoint problem (that is,  T[Z]  is not specified in 
advance), we can set p - 1 in  equation (A2)  without loss of generality. 
Maximizing the Hamiltonian  with respect to the control,  ~(x),  we obtain the 
necessary condition 
This implies the key condition (Borch's rule),  which, after imposing X  = mx, 
becomes 
W'[L) = 
(x)  aEI(1  + t))~'[(l  + .)*)I  1x9  (A3) 
which is equation (11) in the main text. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1.  In  a modification of Lucas's (1972) setup that incorporates 
entrepreneurs and relatively risk-averse  workers,  Azariadis (1978) 
demonstrates that endogenous labor market risk-allocating 
arrangements -- which require an enforceable contingent contract -- may 
enhance the real effects of imperfectly perceived nominal disturbances. 
Efficient ex ante arrangements in Azariadis's model do not permit real 
quantities (hours worked or total compensation) to depend on 
contemporaneously perceived monetary disturbances. 
It is useful to establish some terminology concerning monetary 
neutrality. The traditional view (Patinkin [1965,  chapter IV])  is that a 
money change is neutral only if all real variables for all individuals 
are left unaltered in equilibrium.  Our focus is on economies in which 
monetary events are interconnected  with uninsurable redistributive 
events at the individual level,  necessarily violating the Patinkin 
definition of neutrality.  We employ a weaker neutrality concept -- 
invariance of aggregate real variables -- throughout our discussion. 
3.  Our model thus illustrates a general principle (discussed in more detail 
by Haubrich [1983]) concerning price movements in model economies that 
have (1) incomplete insurance due to private information and (2) 
contractual exchange contingent on aggregate variables.  The principle 
is that aggregate disturbances may have different qualitative effects on 
near-representative-agent  economies with and without contracts if these 
aggregate shocks alter the dispersion of individual circumstances. 
Grossman,  Hart,  and Maskin (1983) also discuss the role of aggregate 
shocks as signals of the unobservable individual disturbances upon which 
we focus here.  However, they pinpoint economies in which asymmetric 
information between firms and workers is key,  but do not explore the 
neutrality of money to any important degree. 
4.  Smith (1985) takes a different approach,  using contracts to add 
uncertainty. 
5.  This notation, though standard in Lucas (1972),  may be a bit confusing. 
Here,  m is the inherited stock of money  and m'  is the period 
t stock of money  (spent by the old in t),  while x is the period t money 
shock. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm6.  Von Mises (1953) assigns an important role to the distribution of 
monetary injections,  even suggesting that,  with such dispersion,  prices 
adjust less than the quantity theory would predict.  He states: 
"This increase in the stock of money,  as we have seen, 
starts with the original owners of the additional 
quantity of money and then transfers itself to those that 
deal with these persons, and so forth  ...  at first only 
certain economic agents benefit and the additional 
quantity of money only spreads gradually through the 
whole community  .... There is no increase in the available 
stock of goods; only its distribution is altered  .... It 
is true that the prices paid for these commodities were 
higher than would have corresponded to the earlier 
purchasing power of money; nevertheless, they were not so 
high as to make full allowance for the changed 
circumstances.  Europe had exported ships and rails, 
metal goods and textiles, furniture and machines, for 
gold which it little needed.  "  (pp. 208-211) 
7.  We follow Lucas (1972) in restricting attention to the stationary price 
functions and considering only monetary equilibria.  We now know that 
even this is a broad class, so we consider only "fundamental" 
equilibria,  ruling out "sunspots" -- equilibria with stationary random 
prices unrelated to the environment's intrinsic uncertainty (see 
Azariadis and Cooper [1985b] and Azariadis and Guesnerie [1986]).  Some 
of these can depend on the economy's entire history. 
8.  Following Lucas,  we use the prime symbol to denote a derivative, 
although it also represents updated variables. 
9.  McCallum (1984) notes that this result derives from two facts:  (1) 
money growth is permanent and (2)  the proportionate distribution of new 
money effectively gives money a positive nominal return.  This rules out 
nonneutrality due to inflationary finance. 
10.  The Borch-Arrow  condition,  equation (ll),  also equilibrates demand and 
supply,  because it determines the price, ~(x),  that clears this market. 
In  most cases,  since the young meet increased demand for goods by 
working more, the market clears.  Rationing takes place only if a very 
low T(x),  and resulting high demand by the old,  would require more than 
24  hours of  work (n > 1).  An Inada condition prevents this.  If the 
marginal utility of the young approaches infinity when either 
consumption or leisure approaches 0,  the left side of equation (I), W', 
also approaches infinity.  The right side must then increase,  implying 
lower consumption  by the old.  Intuitively,  a nonzero probability of 
rationing shifts too much risk to the young,  and the price of output 
rises until the old demand less. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm11.  In  Haubrich (1983),  changes in an aggregate-state  variable alter the 
level of efficient risk-pooling  in the banking model developed by 
Haubrich and King (1983).  Here,  by contrast, the aggregate-state 
variable alters the extent of efficient risk-shifting.  In  both cases, 
it is central that the aggregate shock have implications for the 
dispersion of individual circumstances. 
12.  With convexity,  this implies that both relative and absolute risk 
aversion must decrease with consumption.  Lucas (1972),  with a somewhat 
different problem, assumes o(c)  > 0. 
13.  Smith (1985) takes a similar position.  In  that paper, nominal contracts 
provide lotteries,  which remove a nonconvexity.  Other methods could 
provide the lotteries,  but,  as in our paper, Smith concentrates on 
explaining the observed contract. 
14.  If x  had a discrete distribution,  p  and a  would be a series of 
Lagrange multipliers -- one pair for each point in the x distribution. 
However,  a continuous x distribution permits us to discuss marginal 
changes more readily,  although it requires the control problem. 
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